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Factors for Reasonable Suspicion:
When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Friskedt
DAVID A. HARRIS*
INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the release of the song Cop Killer' by the rap musician Ice-T
ignited a nationwide protest. The song, an imagined response to police
mistreatment of African Americans, incensed law enforcement groups 2 with
lyrics such as "I'm 'bout to bust some shots off, I'm 'bout to dust some cops
off' and "die, pig, die."' A boycott of Time-Warner, Inc., whose subsidiary
distributed the recording, resulted in the elimination of the song from the
album and the eventual release of Ice-T from his recording contract.4
Other lyrics of the song, however, received scant attention. They reveal
what may be the source of the anger behind the speaker's violent reverie:
I'm 'bout to kill me somethin'
A pig stopped me for nuthin' '
Unfortunately, being stopped for nothing-or almost nothing-has become
an all-too-common experience for some Americans since 1968, when the
United States Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio.6 Terry marked a
transformation in the law: For the first time, the Court allowed a criminal
search and seizure without probable cause.7 From Terry forward, the question
t © Copyright 1994 by David A. Hams. All rights reserved.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. LL.M., Georgetown
University Law Center, 1988; J.D., Yale Law School, 1983. My thanks to Daniel Steinbock and
Lawrence Ponoroff for their insightful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to my research
assistant, Michael Merlino, and to Marcia Minnick, my excellent secretary.
1. ICE-T, Cop Killer, on BODY COuNT (Warner Brothers Records 1992).
2. Jerry Seper, 'Cop Killer" Song Spurs Time Boycott, WASH. TiMEs, June 11, 1992, at A5 (law
enforcement groups say song "advocates the killing of police officers").
3. IcE-T, supra note 1.
4. Sheila Rule, lce-T and Warner Are Parting Company, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 29, 1993, at C6.
5. IcE-T, supra note 1.
6. Terry, 392 U.S. I (1968). Of course, police officers stopped and frisked people, especially
African Americans, on very little evidence, before Terry; perhaps it would be more accurate to say Terry
legitimated the practice. See Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The
Gradual but Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. L.J. 567 (1991) (recounting widespread use
of warrantless searches and seizures on the street against African Americans).
7. The first case to allow any search and seizure on less than probable cause was Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Camara, however, involved the search of a building for
violations of city housing codes. Terry was the first case to allow a search and seizure on less than
probable cause in the context of more typical street crimes. See infra notes 25-52 and accompanying
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would not be whether there was probable cause, but whether there was
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.8 The Court based this
change on a balancing of interests.9 On the one hand, law enforcement called
for supple new tools to respond to crime and the dangers its perpetrators
posed to officers;' ° on the other, the Court thought the loss of individual
liberty was not too great, since Terry only allowed a brief stop and a limited,
pat-down search of outer clothing to find weapons."1
During the next twenty-five years, many cases fleshed out Terry's rules.
These cases gradually required less and less evidence for a stop and frisk.'
2
A substantial body of law now allows police officers to stop an individual
based on just two factors: presence in an area of high crime activity, and
evasive behavior.i3 In other words, many courts now find that reasonable
suspicion to stop exists when the person involved 1) is in a crime-prone
location, and 2) moves away from the police.' 4
Even if this does not seem remarkable in the abstract, these "location plus
evasion" cases become distressing when viewed in conjunction with a related
fact: These stops and frisks are applied disproportionately to the poor, to
African Americans, and to Hispanic Americans."5 This is because these
individuals are most likely to live in so-called high crime areas, and to have
reason to avoid the police.'6 Police use Terry stops often in crime-prone
areas, making people in these areas recurrent targets.'7 When residents react
by attempting to avoid the police, "location plus evasion" cases supply a
ready-made basis for more Terry stops. This begins and perpetuates a cycle
of mistrust and suspicion, a feeling that law enforcement harasses African
Americans and Hispanic Americans with Terry stops as a way of controlling
their communities. Thus "location plus evasion" cases bring into sharp focus
the idea of fairness in society in general, and in the criminal justice system
in particular. At a time when racial bias in the justice system is as difficult
an issue as ever, 18 "location plus evasion" cases strengthen the impression
that this country has two justice systems: one for whites and one for
minorities.' 9 Because justice requires that one set of rules applies equally to
text.
8. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-23.
9. Id. at 21-24, 27.
10. Id. at 22-24.
11. Id. at 24-26.
12. See infra notes 72-1 i0 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 148-68 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
I7. See mfra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, The Courts on Trial; Los Angeles Blacks Say Bias Is Issue in Riot Case
and Retrial of Four Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at A14 (stating that the Rodney King verdict
has resulted in perception of justice system as mcist, and trial of four black men accused of beating
white man in verdict's aftermath, while factually distinct, strengthens this perception).
19. See, e.g., New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities, Report of the New York State
Judicial Commission on Minorities, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 181, 186 (1992) ("Where are two justice
systems at work in the courts of New York State, one for Whites, and a very different one for minorities
[Vol. 69:659
FACTORS FOR REASONABLE SUSPICION
everyone, regardless of race, this Article examines the law behind these
inequities, and proposes a solution.
Part I of this Article discusses Terry and the cases that developed the stop
and frisk doctrine.2' Rather than an encyclopedic recitation of the law, Part
I surveys a few leading cases to determine the origins of the current
doctrine.2 Part II explores the Supreme Court's recent decision in Minnesota
v. Dickerson22 and demonstrates that its facts are typical of a body of cases
that allows the police to stop and frisk based on location in a high crime area
plus evasion of the police.23 Part III connects this doctrine to several realities
of life in urban centers to show that this case law and the law enforcement
techniques it legitimates are applied disproportionately to African Americans
and to Hispanic Americans.24 Part IV discusses and proposes reforms.
I. FROM TERRY FORWARD:
How MUCH IS ENOUGH TO STOP AND FRISK?
Terry v. Ohio broke new ground. For the first time,2" the Supreme Court
allowed searches and seizures in traditional on-the-street encounters between
police and citizens with less than probable cause. In addition, Terry began in
earnest the balancing of law enforcement and privacy interests now common
throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.26
In Terry, an experienced officer walking his beat observed a group of men
outside a jewelry store.2 ' Their activities suggested that they were planning
for a daylight armed robbery 2' The officer approached the men, identified
himself as a police officer, and asked for their names. 9 When the men
"mumbled something" in response, the officer patted down the defendant's
outer clothing and found a gun. 0
After rejecting the state's contention that the officer's actions did not
amount to activity that implicated the Fourth Amendment,3 ' the Supreme
and the poor "). Perhaps most discouraging is that little seems to have changed since the release
of the Kerner Commission's report in 1968, which found that members of minority groups perceived
the justice system as rife with bias against the poor and uneducated. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968). See generally Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The Urban
Crumnal Justice System: Where Young + Black+ Male = Probable Cause, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 621
(1993).
20. See infra notes 25-111 and accompanying text.
21. See mnfra notes 25-111 and accompanying text.
22. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
23. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 148-73 and accompanying text.
25. See supra note 7.
26. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 185 (1991) (stating that
Terry "transported Camara's 'reasonableness' balancing test from the realm of administrative searches
to criminal investigations and used it to determine the reasonableness of a warrantless search, rather than
merely to define 'probable cause.' The result has been a diminution in the role of the warrant clause in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.").
27. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5-6, 28 (1968).
28. Id. at 5-6.
29. Id. at 6-7.
30.Id. at7.
31. Id. at 19.
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Court focused on the fact that the officer had acted without probable cause.32
Before Terry, this would no doubt have resulted in suppression of any
evidence gathered; instead, Terry became the occasion for the creation of an
exception to the probable cause requirement.
The Court began by borrowing the balancing of interests test first
articulated in Camara v Municipal Court3 for use with so-called "special
needs" or administrative searches.34 Under this test, courts balanced the
state's asserted need for the search or seizure against the invasion of
individual privacy these actions entailed." Applying this test to encounters
such as the one in Terry-quickly evolving situations where the officer must
rely on rapid judgments and actions to address potentially dangerous
circumstances 3 6-the Court said it would be unreasonable to require police
to take unnecessary risks simply because they lack probable cause to arrest.3a
Instead of probable cause, a stop and frisk would require "specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant" the intrusion.38 "Inarticulate hunches" or mere
suspicion would not be sufficient.39 Performing searches and seizures based
on less than probable cause was permissible, the Court said, based not only
on the needs of law enforcement but on the fact that the intrusions would be
limited in both scope and purpose. 40 Frisks could not go beyond a pat down
of outer clothing to locate a weapon; once the officer knew no weapon was
present, further searching was improper.4' Thus, if a frisk exceeded the
limits of Terry in terms of either scope (for example, reaching into pockets
instead of patting outer clothing) or purpose (for example, the gathering of
contraband instead of a protective search for weapons), courts should suppress
any evidence gathered as a result.
42
In Terry, the Supreme Court established a two-step analysis for stop and
frisk situations. First, if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion to
believe that crime is afoot based on her observations and rational inferences
drawn from them, her training, and her experience, the officer may stop the
suspect.43 Second, if the crime the officer believes is occurring is a violent
one, or if the officer otherwise has reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect
is armed and dangerous, the officer may perform a frisk.44 Except where the
32. Id. at 20.
33. Camara, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
34. Id. at 530-34; DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 185.
35. See DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 185. The very use of the test represented a departure from
prior law. Before Terry, police either had probable cause for a search or seizure or they did not; no
middle ground existed. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 36 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
37. Id. at 23.
38. Id. at 21.
39. Id. at 22.
40. Id. at 24-26.
41. Id. at 26-27.
42. Id. at 29-31.
43. Id. at 27.
44. Id.
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crime is violent, a frisk does not accompany a stop as a matter of course;
rather, it may only take place when the officer reasonably suspects some
danger from weapons.45
The Court went to some length to spell out the limits to its decision. The
officer's "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch"' would not be
sufficient to allow a stop or frisk;4 6 rather, only "specific reasonable
inferences which [the officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in the light of
[the officer's] experience" would be required. 47 Furthermore, any departure
from Terry in terms of the scope of the search would result in suppression of
evidence.4" The Court would accept no justification for a frisk other than a
need to disarm a suspect reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous;
4 9
preserving evidence, for example, would not suffice.5"
Despite these limitations, it was clear that the probable cause requirement,
which had served as a guiding light in encounters between police and
suspects, would play a much smaller role in the future. Terry was-and
remains-a decision that, at bottom, allowed the state to interfere with the
"right of locomotion"'" much more often and on much less evidence than
had been the case before. It was, simply put, a pro "law and order" decision
timed to address the rising violence and tension in cities and on campuses in
1968 and the political rhetoric this unrest inspired. 2
Sibron v. New York,53 a companion case to Terry, emphasized that the new
stop and frisk law required more than just suspicion. In Sibron, the officer
observed the defendant associating with six or eight known drug addicts over
the course of eight hours.54 When the defendant later entered a restaurant,
he began talking with three more known addicts.55 The officer ordered the
defendant out of the restaurant and then said to him, "You know what I am
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 29.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1990).
52. One can read this between the lines in the opinion. First, the Court discounted the argument that
using any standard other than probable cause "[would] only serve to exacerbate police-community
tensions in the crowded centers of our Nation's cities." Terry, 392 U.S. at 12. Second, the Court was
no doubt aware of public concern with "law and order." See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 6, Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (No. 63) (pointing out that the "struggle" between forces of order and
crime had reached such "intensity" that the outcome was uncertain); see also Francis A. Allen, The
Judicial Quest for Penal Justice. The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F 518,
538-39 (pointing out that the Terry decision reflected tensions in society at large); Maclin, supra note
51, at 1269 (stating that Terry represents a compromise between the probable cause standard and the
"public's demand that something be done to promote 'law and order."). For more on the relationship
between the civil unrest in the 1960's and political law and order rhetoric, see David A. Hams, What
Happened to Crime?, 79 A.B.A. J. 138 (1993).
53. Sibron, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
54. Id. at 45.
55. Id.
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after." 6 As the defendant "'mumbled something and reached into his
pocket,"' the officer thrust his hand into the same pocket and found heroin. 7
The Supreme Court found that the officer's observations and the inferences
drawn from them did not even rise to the level of reasonable suspicion that
crime was afoot.5" The officer heard none of the conversations the defendant
had with the addicts, and observed no exchange.5 9 In the memorable
language of the trial court, "'they might have been talking about the World
Series."' 6 At bottom, "[t]he inference that persons who talk to narcotics
addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is simply not the sort
of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon an
individual's personal security "61 The police officer's instincts, alone, would
not bp a sufficient basis for a stop and frisk; a search and seizure such as the
one in Sibron represented the prototypical "hunch" referred to in Terry 62
Further, according to Justice Harlan's concurrence, narcotics violations were
not the type of crimes that one could assume were violent and would thereby
justify an immediate frisk along with a stop; the officer would have to have
articulable suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous. 3 Thus,
Sibron represented an effort to demarcate the limits of Terry, to show lower
courts that Terry did not mean that police could stop and frisk anyone who
seemed suspicious. Terry was, as the Court suggested in Sibron, more limited
than that, for Terry required "particular facts from which [the officer]
reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.
' ' 4
Reasonable suspicion required more than mere association with known
criminals or addicts.65
Brown v. Texas,66 decided eleven years after Terry, also set limits on when
police could stop suspects. In Brown, the police stopped the defendant when
they observed him in an area with a "high incidence of drug traffic. 67 The
officers testified that "the situation 'looked suspicious and we had never seen
[the] subject in that area before."' 6 When the defendant refused to identify
himself, the officers frisked and arrested him, charging him with violating a
Texas statute that criminalized the refusal to give an officer a name and
address upon a legitimate stop. 69 The Supreme Court stated that the
circumstances preceding the stop did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 62.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 47 (quoting the judge from the trial court record in People v. Sibron, 219 N.E.2d 196
(1966)).
61. Id. at 62.
62. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
63. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
64. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64.
65. Id.
66. Brown, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
67. Id. at 49.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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that the defendant was involved in a crime.7" "The fact that [the defendant]
was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis
for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct. In
short, the appellant's activity was no different from the activity of other
pedestrians in that neighborhood."'"
Thus, Brown and Sibron stand for the proposition that neither presence in
a crime-ridden area-even one where drug crime is common-nor association
with known criminals standing alone will be sufficient to support a constitu-
tional stop and frisk. Even though articulable suspicion requires less evidence
than probable cause, an individual's presence where crime consistently takes
place, or association with those involved, does not rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion.
After Brown, however, a very different theme began to emerge from the
Supreme Court's Terry cases: Courts hearing suppression motions based on
Terry stops and frisks should defer to the police officers, because they have
the knowledge, the expertise, and, ultimately, the responsibility for combatting
crime. These cases required progressively less evidence denoting criminal
activity to support findings that the police acted with the requisite reasonable
suspicion. This change took place incrementally, without any direct announce-
ment from the Court. Almost fifteen years after Brown, however, the result
is visible. Discussion of just a few of these cases demonstrates this point.
United States v. Cortez,72 which followed Brown by just two years,
concerned a stop of persons suspected of smuggling illegal aliens into the
United States from Mexico. 73 Law enforcement agents had observed not
illegal activity, but legal activity consistent with smuggling illegal aliens.74
The Supreme Court used Cortez as an occasion to clarify Terry Courts
weighing the legitimacy of particular Terry stops must consider not only the
facts observed by the officer at the scene. Rather, courts must judge stops
based on the totality of the circumstances, or what the Court called "the whole
picture."75 In addition to the facts observed by officers on the scene, this
"whole picture" consisted of police reports7 6 and "patterns of operation of
70. Id. at 52-53.
71. Id. at 52; see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979) (holding that the police had no
reasonable suspicion to detain the customer of a tavern, even if the police had a warrant to search the
tavern and a general suspicion that drug sales took place at the tavern, when there was no indication that
the customer himself was involved or armed). The Court distinguished Brown from other cases, such
as United States v. Brignom-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), and Christensen v. United States, 259 F.2d
192 (D.C. Cir. 1958), in which "the observations of a trained, experienced police officer who is able
to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained
observer" would nse to the level of reasonable suspicion. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52 n.2.
72. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
73. Id. at 413-16.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 417.
76. Id. at 418; see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 232-35 (1985) (holding that
information supplied by flyer issued by one police department based upon articulable facts that
supported a reasonable suspicion was, as objectively read, sufficient to justify another police
department's stop of an automobile driven by the suspect).
1994]
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certain kinds of lawbreakers."" Thus, the reviewing court was to consider
all possible evidence that the suspect had been engaged in wrongdo-
ing-whether the officer who made the stop knew about the evidence or not.
Along with this "whole picture" idea, the Court's opinion in Cortez directly
instructed lower courts to defer to the judgment of police. Officers are
professional observers. 78 Training and experience sharpen their skills. Their
senses thus become attuned to facts that, while ordinary and innocent to the
untrained observer, actually constitute part of the pattern of criminal activity
Thus, "a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions-inferences
and deductions that might well elude an untrained person. 79 Courts must
permit police officers to come to "common-sense conclusions"8 and weigh
the appropriateness of Terry stops "not in terms of library analysis by
scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforce-
ment."'" In other words, courts hearing motions challenging the introduction
of evidence obtained during Terry stops should view the facts brought before
them to support the stop from the position of the police. Courts should ask
whether a police officer-a person engaged in what the Court has called
elsewhere "the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"' 82 would
feel that all of the circumstances "raise a suspicion that the particular
individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. 8 3 Cortez thus sent a
strong signal to lower courts that deference to the police and their trained
crime-fighting sensibilities would henceforth be the order of the day 84
It was this idea of deference to police observation and inference that took
center stage during the 1980's. In a series of cases involving Terry stops
based on so-called drug-courier profiles in airports, 5 the Supreme Court
made clear that persons stopped by police need not be engaged in illegal
activity for the reasonable suspicion standard to be satisfied; rather, it is
enough that some of the actions police observe fit certain broad categories
that, in collective police experience, describe a person who is probably
involved in the drug trade. In the first such case, Reid v. Georgia,86 the
Court held that the stop was improper. Reid involved an individual who had
arrived on an early morning flight from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, a city
77. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
78. Id. at 419. The Court indicated this by noting the "imperative of recognizing that, when used
by trained law enforcement officers, objective facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be combined with
permissible deductions from such fact to form a legitimate basis for suspicion of a particular person and
for action on that suspicion." Id.
79. Id. at 418.
80. Id.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
83. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Ogberaha, 771 F.2d 655, 658 (2d Cir. 1985) ("We further note our
deference to the expertise and 'common sense conclusion[s]' of trained customs inspectors ")
(citation omitted) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986)).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983);
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per cunam).
86. Reid, 448 U.S. 438.
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known to law enforcement officers as a source of illegal drugs.8 7 While
walking through the airport, the individual had repeatedly glanced back at
another passenger.88 These facts standing alone-"isolated instances of
innocent activity"89-did not amount to reasonable suspicion and were
therefore insufficient to justify a Terry stop. The Court implied, however, that
with a greater number of such "innocent" facts, the decision might have been
different.90
By the end of the decade, implication became law United States v.
Sokolow9 l presented the Supreme Court with a drug-courier profile case
containing a larger cluster of "innocent" activities than were present in Reid.
The defendant in Sokolow traveled to Miami, a source city for illegal
narcotics, purchased airline tickets with cash, checked no luggage, appeared
nervous, stayed in Miami only forty-eight hours though the round trip itself
took twenty hours, and travelled under a name that did not match the name
in which his telephone number was listed." While these activities might
appear innocent when considered separately, a trained and experienced officer
looking at them together could draw a different conclusion, a conclusion that
lower courts must respect. While Cortez required "suspicion that the particular
individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing, 9 3 that element is not
lacking simply because the officer gained her suspicions by comparing the
defendant to a profile developed outside of the context of any particular
case. 4 The fact that the suspectfits the profile supplies adequate individual-
ized suspicion. 5 Thus, Sokolow reemphasizes the message that lower courts
should defer to law enforcement and its collective knowledge and experience
in passing upon the propriety of Terry stops.
As the 1990's began, the approval of Terry stops based upon ever smaller
amounts of evidence continued. Alabama v. White 6 concerned the stop of a
car based on an anonymous tip. The tipster had correctly described the
defendant's vehicle, time and place of departure, and destination.97 The
Supreme Court held that the stop was justified, even though the anonymous
nature of the tip permitted no estimation of its reliability The fact that police
observation corroborated some, though not all, of the tip was sufficient.9 8
Thus, White permitted courts to use a sliding scale to evaluate Terry stops
based on tips. When the informant's trustworthiness is unknown, the tip
requires greater corroboration; however, if the information comes from a
87. Id. at 441.
88. Id. at 439.
89. Katherine L. Pringle et al., Twenty-Second Annual Review of Crimnal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, 1991-1992, 81 GEO. L.J. 853, 882 (1993).
90. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441.
91. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
92. Id. at 3.
93. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
94. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10.
95. See id. at 9-10.
96. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
97. Id. at 327.
98. Id. at 329-31.
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known source, less corroboration will suffice. 99 Thus, anonymous tips, which
may actually be fabrications designed to harass or even obtain revenge,' 0
may nevertheless serve as the basis for stops if they are accompanied by some
corroboration.'0 '
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz"'0 represents perhaps the most
far-reaching example of how far the Supreme Court is willing to let police go
in stopping ordinary citizens. In Sitz, the police set up a fixed sobriety
checkpoint. In an hour and fifteen minutes, each of the 126 cars that passed
through it was stopped and its driver questioned, resulting in two arrests for
driving under the influence.0 3 The stops were made without reference to
any observations of any particular car; that is, the police had no suspicion,
reasonable or otherwise, concerning any individual who was stopped. Rather,
the police stopped all cars on the blockaded road. 10 4 The Supreme Court
returned to its balancing of interests analysis to justify this practice. 05
Given the magnitude of the drunken driving problem 1 6 and the "slight"
nature of the intrusion upon the privacy of those stopped, 10 7 the Supreme
Court found the stops at the checkpoint to be reasonable, despite the absence
of individualized suspicion. 0S It mattered little that other, less intrusive and
more effective techniques to fight drunken driving did not entail stopping
persons about whom there was not the slightest hint of suspicion.1' 9 Again,
the Court's theme was deference to police judgment: "[F]or purposes of
Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives
remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of,
and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number
of police officers.'.1
99. See id. at 330.
100. See LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME (Frank J. Remington ed., 1967); see
also David Burnham, F.B.L Says 12,000 Faulty Reports on Suspects Are Issued Each Day, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 1985, at Ai.
101. This sliding scale approach, which one commentator has aptly described as "more slide than
scale," Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 394
(1974), exists nowhere else in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence (at least not yet) but in the treatment
of Terry stops. This does not mean, however, that the sliding scale principle operates in a small,
unimportant area; on the contrary, Terry stops may be the most common form of encounter between
police and individuals.
102. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
103. Id. at 448.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
106. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451.
107. Id. at 451-52.
108. Id. at 453.
109. Id. at 453-54; see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)
(citation omitted) (holding that individualized suspicion for search (in this case, drug testing) was
unnecessary in light of magnitude of governmental interest in preventing railroad accidents and that "a
showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be
presumed unreasonable.").
110. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54. Professor Dressler notes that the suspicionless stops upheld in Sitz
were the "fruit" of dicta in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47
(1979), which pointed toward the possibility that the Supreme Court would allow police to use such
tools. DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 202-03. Interestingly, upon remand, a Michigan court of appeals
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Thus, the Court's recent Terry cases show what Terry only hinted at: The
reasonable suspicion standard does not require much evidence to allow an
officer to make a Fourth Amendment seizure. Further, the answer to the
question "How much is enough?" has shifted, slowly but inexorably, to the
point that a few innocent activities grouped together, or even no suspicious
activities at all, can be enough. The Court wants police judgment in these
matters respected; deference is the rule. The police are to be given wide
latitude to operate as they see fit.
Have the lower courts heard this message? If so, how have they interpreted
it, and what kind of police behavior has resulted? The Supreme Court's
decision in Minnesota v Dickerson". provides a clue; lower court decisions
provide proof positive that the message has, in fact, been received.
II. LOCATION PLUS EVASION EQUALS REASONABLE SUSPICION
A. Dickerson: Defense of Terry or Representative of Its Demise?
In Minnesota v. Dickerson, the question before the Supreme Court was
whether a lower court may admit into evidence contraband found by an officer
using only his sense of touch during an otherwise proper stop and frisk."2
Put another way, Minnesota asked the Court to create a tactile parallel to the
"plain-view" exception.
The Court had little trouble creating the new "plain-feel" exception.
According to Justice White, the author of the Court's opinion, there was
nothing new about the exception."' In fact, what the Court refused to do is
more interesting than what it did. In its brief, Minnesota" a implicitly
presented the Court with the opportunity to use Dickerson to expand and
reinterpret Terry Perhaps "reinvent" might be a better word; Terry, the state
argued, ought to allow stops and frisks not just to locate weapons, but also to
search for contraband."' Justice White's response was unequivocal; he
struck down the use of sobriety checkpoints under the Michigan Constitution, because, as construed by
the court, it does not allow suspicionless searches. Sitz v. Department of State Police, 485 N.W.2d 135
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992), affd, 443 Mich. 744 (1993); cf State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (holding that the Utah Constitution allows suspicionless stops at highway roadblocks only with
legislative authorization), cert. granted, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
111. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
112. Id. at 2134. The Court stated that it wanted to resolve a conflict among the federal circuits and
state courts on this question. Id. Some of these courts had recognized the "plain feel" exception; others
had explicitly rejected it. Id. at 2134-35 n.l.
113. Id. at 2136-37.
114. Minnesota was joined by the Federal Government and numerous national and state law
enforcement groups as amicus curiae. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019); Brief Amici Curiae of
Amencans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al., In Support of the Petitioner State of Minnesota,
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019).
115. Certainly, this is how several of the Justices viewed Minnesota's argument. See, e.g., Minnesota
v. Dickerson, 113 U.S. 2130 (1993), Tr. of Argument at 7, 12, 13. As Justice O'Connor put it, "it
sounds like you're arguing for more, that you're arguing for an extension of Terry and just an outright
recognition that officers can search not only for weapons but for drugs." Id. at 13. Counsel for
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rejected the argument forcefully and explicitly 116 In a traditional explication
of Terry's principles, Justice White explained the two-step analysis required
by Terry- First, if the conduct the officer observes leads her, in light of her
experience, to believe that crime is afoot, she may stop the person involved
and make inquiries designed to confirm or dispel her suspicions. 7 Second,
if the officer reasonably believes that the individual might be armed and
dangerous, the officer may pat down the person's outer clothing to determine
whether the person is carrying a weapon."5 Justice White said this patdown
search "must be strictly 'limited to that which is necessary for the discovery
of weapons'";i9 its purpose "'is not to discover evidence."" 2 The fruits
of any further search should be suppressed.''
Thus, the Court's opinion in Dickerson appears to resist the recent trend of
allowing police ever more leeway in Terry situations. The Court easily could
have sustained Minnesota's position based on a balancing of factors. The
Court could have concluded that interests such as the growing dangers of
armed crime, the number of guns on the street, the violence of the drug trade,
or the need to stamp out illegal narcotics outweigh what might seem a
comparatively minor type of intrusion on the defendant's person. To be sure,
this approach might have required cutting Terry from its doctrinal moorings,
but the Court has done as much before in other areas of the law 122 Instead,
the Court stayed true to Terry as it was written.
Thus at first blush Dickerson appears to reinforce the limits the Supreme
Court put on the stop and frisk power in Terry A close look at Dickerson's
facts, however, reveals an example of what the stop and frisk doctrine has
become, and just how far the Supreme Court and lower courts have drifted
from Terry Although the question of whether the facts justified the Terry stop
Minnesota argued that the Court need not go so far, but Minnesota clearly desired exactly the "more"
to which Justice O'Connor referred. In reply to a question asking whether Minnesota would object to
the Court holding simply that "a police officer ought to be able to use all of his senses to search for
weapons," Tr. at 12, Minnesota's counsel stated, "That is a correct statement of the existing law
previous to this case, but we believe, Your Honor, that they ought to be able to use all of their senses
in all the work they do in terms of law enforcement." Tr. at 13. Counsel for the respondent pointed
out this poorly concealed argument: "[W]hat the State of Minnesota is asking the Court to do in this
case is to make Terry's rule into an evidence-gathering function." Tr. at 30; see also State of
Minnesota v. Timothy Eugene Dickerson, District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Hennepin County, D.C.
File No. 89067687, Tr. of Hearing on Suppresion Motion [hereinafter Tr. of Hearing on Suppression
Motion], at 9 (Question: "Why did you stop [the defendant]?" Answer: "To check him for weapons and
contraband.").
116. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2135-36.
117. Id. at 2135.
118. Id. at 2136.
119. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)).
120. Id. (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Belton involved the search of a car's
interior incident to a lawful arrest in which the individuals were far removed from the car and were thus
unable to reach anything inside. Id. at 456. The Court held that the search was proper, even though prior
law had allowed such searches only if arrestees could obtain weapons from areas accessible to them.
Id. at 457-58. The Court allowed the search simply because it was incident to a lawful arrest, whether
or not the arrestees could reach weapons, id. at 462-63, and because a bright line rule was preferable.
Id. at 458-59.
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in Dickerson was not the issue before the Supreme Court, 21 they provide
a prototypical example of cases lower courts see every day
In Dickerson, two police officers observed the defendant leave a twelve-unit
apartment building.124 The officers knew that drug use and sales took place
in the building. One of the officers had previously participated in the
execution of search warrants at the building. 25 Neither officer knew the
defendant or knew of any reason to connect him to prior illegal activity in the
building, nor did they know where inside the building the defendant had
been.26 According to one officer, as soon as the man saw the police, he
abruptly changed directions, turned, and entered an alley 127 Based on these
facts alone-a location associated with criminal activity and evasive
action-the officers followed the man into the alley, stopped him, and frisked
him. They found one-fifth of one gram of crack cocaine in his pocket.'
28
While the United States Supreme Court did not rule on the propriety of the
stop and frisk, the Minnesota courts did. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court and found the stop to be proper. 29 Evasive conduct
alone, the court of appeals said, would have been sufficient to allow a Terry
stop. 30 Surely, combining evasive conduct with the defendant's presence in
an apartment complex in which there was a history of drug activity supplied
more than enough evidence to support reasonable suspicion. 3' The Supreme
Court of Minnesota agreed.
32
B. Lower Court Cases
The facts in Dickerson are representative of a body of federal and state
cases that accept just two facts-presence in a "high crime" or "high drug
123. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134.
124. Id. at 2133. Though the Court mentions the fact that the building had 12 apartments, it elides
the fact that there was no evidence that all of these units were drug involved by labeling the entire
building a "notorious 'crack house."' Id. The Court leaves the reader with only one possible
conclusion-the defendant was in the building to buy drugs. The mere fact that there were 12 separate
dwellings in the building, however, suggests that a person could be in the building for many reasons,
drug use or purchase being only one. This was the significance of the Minnesota Court of Appeals'
finding that the officer "neither recognized Dickerson nor identified which apartment Dickerson left."
State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462,464 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added). Indeed, the strongest
inference that the record supports is that, at some time in the past, at most four of the twelve apartments
may have been searched. Tr. of Hearing on Suppresion Motion, supra note 115, at 22.
125. Dickerson, 113 S. CL at 2133.
126. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at 464.
127. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133. During the trial, the defendant vigorously disputed this version
of the facts. The trial court, however, accepted the officer's version of events. State v. Dickerson, 481
N.V.2d 840, 842 (Minn. 1992); Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at 464.
128. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133. Amazingly, the officer admitted on the stand that his purpose
was to stop the suspect and search not only for weapons, but for contraband. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d
at 842. Nothing seems to have come of this admission.
129. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at 464.
130. Id. at 465 (citing State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 826-27 (Minn. 1989)).
131. Id. at 462.
132. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 843.
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activity" location and evasive behavior-as adequate grounds for reasonable
suspicion and thus sufficient for Terry stops.
1. Location
The Supreme Court has made clear that location alone is insufficient to
support the requisite reasonable suspicion. 133 Nevertheless, cases abound in
which the defendant's presence in a "high crime area" or an "area of high
drug activity" 1 34 Is, if not the only justification for a Terry stop, at least the
primary reason for the stop. 135 The eagerness with which locations are
declared high crime areas should generate skepticism in courts, but it does
not. 136
133. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (holding that an individual's presence in an area with
a high incidence of narcotics trafficking is insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion); see also
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968) (associating with known drug addicts is insufficient to
allow stop or frisk). Professor LaFave has noted that "simply being about in a high-crime area should
not of itself ever be viewed as a sufficient basis to make an investigative stop." WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 457-58 (2d ed. 1986).
134. There are numerous examples of cases using this terminology. See, e.g., Brown, 443 U.S. at 49,
52 (using the phrases "high incidence of drug traffic" and "neighborhood frequented by drug users");
United States v. Anderson, 754 F Supp. 442, 443 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding that the police "knew this
neighborhood was one of high drug-related criminal activity"); State v. Fincher, 603 N.E.2d 329, 331
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (finding that the police were patrolling in an area of "high drug activity").
135. While cases listed here come out both ways, all are examples of the fact that police make such
stops with some frequency. See, e.g., United States v. Maragh, 695 F Supp. 1223 (D.D.C. 1988) (police
officer had no reasonable suspicion for the stop when the defendant, traveling with two other black
males, stopped in a train station, a prime point of arrival for drug couriers, and made eye contact with
the officer), rev'd, 894 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and cert. denied, 498 U.S. 880 (1990); State v.
White, 398 S.E.2d 778 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (the defendant's presence on a block with "increased drug
traffic" (in his own driveway), and another individual's startled look and quick departure from the
location was insufficient to support the Terry stop); Bozeman v. State, 397 S.E.2d 30, 32 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990) (the defendant's presence in a car with a companion at 4:45 a.m. parked in a remote section of
a parking lot in high crime area was sufficient for reasonable suspicion); State v. Dubose, 291 S.E.2d
39 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (the defendant's presence at night in a spot where a murder had occurred 24
hours earlier and where five men "appeared to be gambling, and drinking beer and wine" justified the
stop); Gibbs v. State, 306 A.2d 587, 593 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973) (the defendant's presence in a "high
crime area" for several hours was insufficient to support reasonable suspicion required for a stop); Wold
v. State, 430 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Minn. 1988) (the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime while
the victim was being taken away by paramedics supplied reasonable suspicion for the stop, even though
"the record leaves some doubt as to the extent [the defendant] was involved" in a verbal altercation with
the paramedics); State v. Barth, No. 92 CA 17, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 122 (Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1993)
(the stop of a defendant based on his presence in a high crime area late at night was unjustified); State
v. Crosby, 594 N.E.2d 110, 112-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (a stop based on the fact that the defendant
was sitting in a car parked in a high drug area talking to an individual outside the car who ran when
the police approached was not based upon reasonable suspicion); State v. Chandler, 560 N.E.2d 832,
837 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (a Terry stop made on basis that the area had high drug activity and that there
was "rustling around" inside the vehicle was not based on reasonable suspicion); State v. Anfield, 770
P.2d 919 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (no reasonable suspicion for a stop of a defendant walking down a street
in a high crime area at night carrying a bag); State v. Goggins, Comm. Pleas, Cuyahoga County, No.
253663 (June 1992) (the presence of a car in an area of high drug activity, bad license tag, and the fact
that a man outside the car talked to persons inside the car and ran as police approached did not supply
reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop of the passenger).
136. See LAFAVE, supra note 133, at 456-57, and cases cited therein; Shen L. Johnson, Race and
the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 222 n.42 (1983) (asserting that courts "should be
more cautious" in accepting testimony that particular areas are crime prone because some police officers
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2. Evasion of the Police
Four courts have explicitly stated that merely avoiding the police can be
enough, by itself, to justify a Terry stop.'37 This reasoning disregards the
describe all areas that way); see also JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 218 (2d ed. 1975)
("If an honest citizen resides in a neighborhood heavily populated by criminals, just as the chances are
high that he might be one, so too are the chances that he might be mistaken for one.") (emphasis added).
Caution in this area would be especially appropriate, because, as Professor Johnson has argued, when
courts blindly accept police expertise in pronouncing a place an area of high crime or drug activity, they
risk becoming party to police prejudice and stereotypes concerning the residents of ghetto neighbor-
hoods. Johnson, supra, at 255.
137. United States v. Jackson, 741 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1984) (flight by two men in an alley upon
police cruiser's appearance, which prompted one of the men to yell "It's the police, man, run,
constituted suspicion reasonable enough to allow a stop); Platt v. State, 589 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 1992)
(flight of parked vehicle immediately upon police car pulling in behind it constitutes reasonable
suspicion sufficient to allow stop); State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 826-27 (Minn. 1989) (a motorist's
exit from a highway upon observing the police and reentry a short time later was enough to constitute
reasonable suspicion); State v. Anderson, 454 N.W.2d 763, 766-67 (Wis. 1990) (the defendant's "flight
from" the police, without more, was sufficient to support the stop); see also State v. Williamson, 206
N.W.2d 613, 614-15 (Wis. 1973) (there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant when he pulled
his car over upon seeing the police and pulled it away from the curb when the police seemed to be
gone). Contra State v. Master, 619 P.2d 482,483 (Ariz. 1980) (there was no reasonable suspicion where
the defendant abruptly changed the direction in which he was walking at the same time the police turned
their car around for a better observation); Cauthen v. United States, 592 A.2d 1021, 1024-25 (D.C.
1991) (the defendant's rapidly walking away when the police approached after receiving an anonymous
tip that unidentified, undescribed males were dealing drugs was insufficient to support the stop, even
though the defendant dropped the bag as the police approached); In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138, 142 (D.C.
1987) (an attempt to evade the police, without more, is insufficient grounds to justify a Terry stop);
People v. Fox, 421 N.E.2d 1082 (III. Ct. App. 1981) (driving away upon the approach of a marked
police car did not support reasonable suspicion for the stop); Commonwealth v. Stratton, 331 A.2d 741,
742 (Pa. 1974) ("[T]here is no question that flight alone, even upon seeing a police officer, would not
be sufficient to justify stopping and searching the defendant."). Note that many other cases combine
evasion with just the thinnest veneer of other facts. See, e.g., Morgan v. Woessner, 975 F.2d 629, 638-
39 (9th Cir. 1992) (the fact that the suspect allegedly looked at the officers, then turned and walked
away, in addition to the fact that the suspect was black, did not amount to reasonable suspicion); People
v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Colo. 1983) (there was no reasonable suspicion where the defendant
ran to a nearby building with his hand in his pocket upon seeing the officers); Commonwealth v.
Martinez, 588 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (there was no reasonable suspicion when the defendant
rapidly walked away from police officers who were approaching a group of people on the corner where
the defendant had been talking and the defendant .'[held] her hands in the front of her coat, leaning
forward, as if to be holding something").
In light of California v. Hodan D., 11 S. Ct. 1547, 1549 n.1 (1991) ("That it would be unreasonable
to stop, for brief inquiry, young men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police is not
self-evident, and arguably contradicts proverbial common sense. See Proverbs 28:1 ('The wicked flee
when no man pursueth'). We do not decide that point here '), it would hardly be surprising if lower
courts felt that flight from police, by itself, was sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion, though the
Court in Hodart D. hesitated to go that far. See also Michigan v. Chesterut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 (1988)
(Kennedy, J., concumng) ("respondent's unprovoked flight gave the police ample cause to stop him.").
Since Hodari D., the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in at least two cases in which a state asked
the Court to rule that flight from police alone justified a Terry stop. Florida v. Jones, 592 So. 2d 248
(1991), petition for writ of certiorari, Dkt. No. 91-1634 (1992) at i ("Question Presented: Is an
individual's flight from an identifiable law enforcement officer sufficiently suspicious in and of itself
to justify a temporary investigative stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio[] and California v. Hodan D.[]."),
cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 296 (1992); Nebraska v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359 (1992), petition for writ of
certiorari, Dkt. No. 92-916 (1992) at 6 (Court should grant the writ because "[t]here is presently a
conflict among the state courts and among the federal circuit courts as to whether flight from law
enforcement is sufficient to justify an investigative stop."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1625 (1993).
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fact that the Constitution allows a person to walk away when questioned by
the police.
138
3. Location and Evasion
Even if either presence in a high crime location or evasion alone would be
insufficient, courts often find that the combination of these two factors is
enough to sustain a Terry stop. 139 To be sure, some cases hold to the
138. The Supreme Court has held that "[a citizen] may not be detained even momentarily without
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more,
furnish those grounds." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,498 (1983) (citing United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 544 (1980) (a citizen who does not wish to answer police questions may disregard the
officer's questions and walk away.)); Florida v. Bostick, 1II S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991) (while police may
question an individual about whom they have no suspicion, "an individual may decline an officer's
request without feanng prosecution."); see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 43, 49 (1979) (no reasonable
suspicion justified a seizure where the police stopped the defendant in an alley associated with drug
trafficking and the defendant "refused to identify himself and angrily asserted that that the officers had
no right to stop him."); United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 126 (4th Cir. 1991) (refusal to answer
questions cannot be the basis for reasonable suspicion because "the ominous implication in this
argument is that only guilty persons have anything to keep from the eyes of the police"); LAFAVE, supra
note 133, at 448 ("It is not to be doubted that [actions aimed at evading the police] may be taken into
account by the police and that together with other suspicious circumstances these reactions may well
justify a stopping for investigation.") (emphasis added). Obviously, there is more to the point. As
Professor Maclin has said, it is all very well to say that a citizen need not respond to police inquiries;
it is another thing to ask how many would actually resist, and why they should have to do so. "The
point is not [only] that very few persons will have the moxie to assert their fourth amendment rights
in the face of police authority, although we know that most will not. It is whether citizens in a free
society should be forced to challenge the police in order to enjoy [their rights]." Maclin, supra note 51,
at 1306.
139. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 450 So. 2d 692, 694-95 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (presence in a high crime
area at night and "walking briskly away from the scene" when the police approached was sufficient to
amount to reasonable suspicion), rev'd in part on other grounds, 456 So. 2d 162 (La. 1984); State v.
Belton, 441 So. 2d 1195 (La. 1983) (reasonable suspicion existed to stop a defendant who fled when
the police approached a bar where narcotics were sold), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953 (1984); State v.
Williams, 416 So. 2d 91 (La. 1982) (leaving the location upon seeing the police in a high crime area
amounts to reasonable suspicion); State v. Wade, 390 So. 2d 1309, 1311-12 (La: 1980) (the defendant's
presence in a high crime area plus flight upon observing the police amounted to reasonable suspicion);
State v. Taylor, 363 So. 2d 699, 703 (La. 1978) (presence in a high crime area plus change in speed of
movement amounted to reasonable suspicion); State v. Stinnett, 760 P.2d 124, 127 (Nev. 1988) (the
defendant's presence in a group of men "huddled" in a drug area and his running away upon seeing a
police car were sufficient to support reasonable suspicion for the stop); State v. Butler, 415 S.E.2d 719,
722-23 (N.C. 1992) (the defendant's presence on the comer known as "'drug hole"' and the fact that
the defendant "immediately turned and walked away" upon making eye contact with the police was
sufficient to support the stop, even though the defendant was unknown to the officers); State v.
Andrews, 565 N:E.2d 1271, 1273-74 (Ohio 1991) (the defendant's presence in a high crime area and
his running from the direction of a police car gave an experienced officer articulable suspicion to stop
the defendant); State v. Glover, 806 P.2d 760, 761-62 (Wash. 1991) (the defendant's presence in a high
crime area, and his avoidance of officers upon seeing them amounted to reasonable suspicion for stop);
State v. Little, 806 P.2d 749, 753 (Wash. 1991) (the defendant's presence in a high crime area plus
flight upon seeing an officer provided the officer with "substantial grounds of criminal activity [sic] to
justify a detention."); State v. Rice, 795 P.2d 739, 741-42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (an officer acted with
reasonable suspicion when the defendant was found in a high crime area where shots reportedly were
fired and the defendant seemed "to be considering running away"); see also United States v. Lane, 909
F.2d 895, 898-99 (6th Cir. 1990) (the defendant's presence in a drug area and flight from officers were
sufficient to support the stop), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 977 (1991); Stephenson v. United States, 296
A.2d 606, 607, 610 (D.C. 1972) (there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendants seen moving at a
brisk jog near the location of recent burglaries), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 907 (1973). Numerous other
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contrary 14' This shows that lower courts are not all of one mind on "loca-
tion plus evasion" cases. The point, however, is that these cases, whichever
way they come out, represent a widespread police practice. In other words,
these cases indicate that stopping peopleIbased merely on location and evasion
is a common police technique, whether or not courts ultimately admit the
evidence gathered.'
4 1
cases allow stops based on location and evasion, where just one or two other innocuous factors are
present. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 754 F. Supp. 442, 444-45 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (the defendant's
presence late at night in an area known for drug activity with others known as traffickers, plus flight
upon approach of the police, was sufficient to amount to reasonable suspicion); Peay v. United States,
597 A.2d 1318, 1320-21 (D.C. 1991) (the defendant's presence in front of a building known for
narcotics trafficking and flight into the building upon seeing the police, combined with fact that the
defendant was "clutching something in his hand" amounted to reasonable suspicion); State v. Cook, 332
So. 2d 760, 763 (La. 1976) (the defendant's presence in a high cnme area and flight when officers
approached, plus looking suspiciously around the comer of a building, supported a finding of reasonable
suspicion).
140. See, e.g., People v. Aldridge, 674 P.2d 240, 243 (Cal. 1984) ("[F]light may imply a
consciousness of guilt, and combined with other factors could justify an investigative stop, [but it is
insufficient alone]"); People v. Wilson, 784 P.2d 325, 326-27 (Colo. 1989) (the defendant's presence
in a drug area and flight from police were insufficient to support a stop based upon reasonable
suspicion); People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272, 1275-76 (Colo. 1983) ("It is only when a person's effort
to avoid police contact is coupled with an officer's specific knowledge connecting that person to some
other action or circumstance indicative of criminal conduct that the evasive action, takes on a
sufficiently suspicious character to justify a stop ); Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 314-17
(D.C. 1989) (there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop when defendant was seen in a "high
narcotics traffic area" with other suspects and walked quickly away from the police); Ruffin v. State,
412 S.E.2d 850, 852-53 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (there was no reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant
because he was in an area known for narcotics trafficking and walked "briskly" away upon noticing the
police); Watkins v. State, 420 A.2d 270, 274 (Md. Ct. App. 1980) ("[W]e agree with the majority of
courts that view the unequivocal flight of a suspect upon seeing the police as not alone necessarily
indicative of criminal activity.'); People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d 451, 460 (Mich. 1985) (flight "does
not alone supply particularized, reasoned, articulable basis to conclude that criminal activity [is] afoot.");
State v. Fleming, 415 S.E.2d 782, 785-86 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no reasonable suspicion existed
to stop the defendant in a high cnme area who initially walked away from an officer); People v.
Posnijak, 72 A.2d 966 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (finding that no reasonable suspicion existed for the stop
of a defendant who was present, with others, at the scene of a reported crime and who walked away);
State v. Fincher, 603 N.E.2d 329, 332-33 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (there was no reasonable suspicion
based on the defendant's presence in an area of high drug activity and change of direction upon seeing
the police); State v. Hewston, No. 59095, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3192 (Aug. 2, 1990) (there was no
reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on presence in an area of high drug activity and flight
from police); see also United States v. Crawford, 891 F.2d 680, 681 (8th Cir. 1989) (the defendant's
presence at a building in which a drug trafficker had an apartment, the defendant's running around to
the back of the building, and his taking a bicycle and coats out of the building while looking up and
down the street did not amount to reasonable suspicion); United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875,
878-80 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (there was no reasonable suspicion when the defendant drove in circles in a
residential area, watching officers in a rear view mirror).
141. It should go without saying that with the addition of even one or two additional factors, location
and evasion stops are generally valid. LAFAvE, supra note 133, at 448-58 (other factors include
suspects' reactions-other than flight-to police presence, whether individual fits in an area, suspect's
companionship with another person lawfully arrested, and time of day).
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4. Automatic Frisks in Drug Cases
Perhaps as a result of the "war on drugs," 42 or society's general antipathy
toward accused persons, state and federal cases from all over the country have
concluded that the trade in illegal narcotics almost inevitably entails the use
of deadly weapons. Therefore, almost any time that the crime suspected in a
Terry situation involves drugs, courts routinely allow a frisk following a stop
as a matter of course. 43
'Courts allow these automatic frisks in drug cases whether or not there are
any actual indications that the suspect is armed. 144 This is contrary to
Sibron, which stated that "[t]he suspect's mere act of talking with a number
of known narcotics addicts over an eight-hour period no more gives rise to
reasonable fear of life or limb on the part of the police officer than it justifies
an arrest for committing a crime." 141
Courts also fail to distinguish between drug use or possession on the one
hand and drug trafficking on the other for purposes of judging whether the
defendant might be armed. 46 Thus, even if at the time Terry was decided
courts were uncertain whether possession of drugs was the type of crime
"whose nature creates the substantial likelihood that [the suspect] is
armed," 47 they now treat drug involvement as a proxy for a reasonable
142. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of the Improbable Cause,
Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1171, 1224 (1983) ("[T]he maleficent trafficking in drugs" may produce "atrophy of the fourth
amendment."); Maclin, supra note 51, at 1334 (the Court "remains fixated on expanding the
government's investigatory powers to help control the drug crisis" despite evidence of its futility);
Stephen A. Salzburg, Another View of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustrated by the
Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Pi-r. L. REv. 1, 4, 23 (1986) (courts are "turning their backs on
Fourth Amendment principles, in order to aid the war against illicit drugs.").
143. See, e.g., United States v. Woodall, 938 F.2d 834, 837 (8th Cir. 1991) (the fact that "narcotics
traffickers frequently carry weapons," as well as the facts that the officer recognized the driver as person
previously arrested for a narcotics violation and the defendant made motions-toward the floor of the car,
justified a pat down); United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir. 1988) (a pat-down was
proper because the officer saw a bag in the car which contained cash, thought the cash might be drug
money, and "persons involved with drugs often carry weapons"); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d
1294, 1317 (2d Cir. 1987) (a frisk was justified because it is reasonable to assume those involved in sale
of narcotics carry weapons), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 957 (1987); United States v. Ceballos, 719 F Supp.
119, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[T]he need to frisk those suspected of committing a narcotics offense in
the course of a street encounter is obvious. Here, the agent's reasonable suspicion that they had
witnessed a narcotics transaction established the requisite premise for conducting a self-protective frisk
for weapons.'); State v. Bechtold, 783 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (the fact that officers "knew
that people involved in the manufacture and transportation of [methamphetamines] commonly carry
weapons" served as part of the justification for a pat down); State v. Flynn, 285 N.W.2d 710, 713 (Wis.
1980) (officers may frisk for weapons in cases involving drug offenses) (dictum), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
846 (1980).
144. See, e.g., State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (despite the fact that
the defendant made no attempt to conceal anything and that the officer "did not notice any suspicious
bulges in [the defendant's] clothing," the officer frisked the defendant after stopping him).
145. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968); see also LAFAvE, supra note 133, at 507 (in order
for frisks to lawfully take place in minor crimes, including drug possession and trafficking in small
amounts, circumstances other than the crime itself must be present).
146. E.g., Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at 465 (an officer had experience with weapon-carrying drug
traffickers; from this, he testified that "drug possessors often carry weapons') (emphasis added).
147. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurrng).
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suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous. Therefore, any person
stopped for any drug-related activity automatically may be frisked.
III. IMPLICATIONS: OPEN SEASON IN THE INNER CITY
As the four groups of cases discussed above show, police have considerable
power to stop citizens and perform searches based on very limited facts. The
implications of this point, however, differ depending on who the citizen
stopped and frisked is, and where he or she lives. The unfortunate fact is that
Terry and its progeny have resulted in stops and frisks of residents of inner
cities-primarily poor persons, African Americans, and Hispanic Ameri-
cans-far out of proportion to their numbers, 14 8 and often without justifica-
tion. 149 These searches and seizures carry a high price, not only to the
individuals involved but to all of society
A. The Inner City Location of High Crime
and Drug Trafficking Areas
The "high crime areas" and "areas associated with high levels of drug
activity" in the cases explored in this Article are not, by any means, evenly
distributed across urban areas.' On the contrary, zones of high crime
activity are concentrated in inner city neighborhoods.' In fact, the terms
"inner city neighborhood" and "high crime area" are synonymous for many
Americans, including many of the regular participants in the criminal justice
process.'52 These neighborhoods tend to be poorer, older, and less able to
support jobs and infrastructure than either city neighborhoods more distant
from the urban core or suburban locations.
B. Minority Groups: Residents of Inner Cities
It will not surprise anyone who lives or works in an urban center to learn
that these areas share another characteristic in addition to the presence of
crime: They are racially segregated. African Americans and Hispanic
148. See infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 150-75 and accompanying text.
150. DAVID T. HERBERT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN CRIME 102 (1982) (studies identifying large
cities and densely populated areas as "main problem areas" of crime).
151. Id. at 19; Associated Press, Capitol Led the Nation in '88 Justice Spending, N.Y. TIMES, July
16, 1990, at AlIl (higher per capita spending on criminal justice in urban areas explained, in part, by
the fact that 'there's more crime in high-population-density areas than in rural areas"); John Hood,
Making Parents Pay: Atlanta Law Sets Off a Curfew Craze of Questionable Value, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 25,
1991, at Tempo 17 ("[In fact, some areas are more dangerous than others, and studies show that the
dangerous ones, for various reasons, tend to be poor, black neighborhoods.').
152. James M. Doyle, "It's the Third World Down There!" The Colonialist Vocation and American
Criminal Justice, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71 (1992) (lawyers, police officers, and others involved
in the criminal justice system use colonial "White Man's" frame of reference in relating to and
articulating "stories" concerning crime and inner cities).
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Americans make up almost all of the population in most of the neighborhoods
the police regard as high crime areas. 153
Twenty-five years after the Kerner Commission found America moving
toward "two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal,"'54
studies continue to show that racial segregation remains one of the most
signficant characteristics of American cities.'55 For example, Professor
George C. Galster has argued that "virtually all of our major metropolitan
centers where large numbers of minorities live are highly segregated."'' 56
Numerous forces cause this segregation; the huge economic disparities that
persist between the races play a key role. 5 7 Segregation's effects are
nothing short of devastating. It narrows and weakens networks and institutions
that support minority communities; it may encourage the growth of isolating
"subcultural attitudes, behaviors, and speech patterns" that can impede
mainstream success; it results in the attraction of only low-paying, short-term
employment; and it increases "racial competition and suspicion." '
While segregation harms society as a whole, the more important point for
purposes of this discussion is that African Americans and Hispanic Americans
find themselves segregated into crime-prone locations. Minorities "tend to
cluster in or near the older, core municipality of the metropolitan area."'5 9
By virtue of their relative socioeconomic status, not to mention persistent
racial discrimination,' 60 African Americans and Hispanic Americans find
themselves living in the very areas of cities labeled "high crime areas" and
"drug trafficking locations." More importantly, they not only live there, they
are also more likely to work in these areas than in safer, suburban loca-
tions.' 6' Thus, for purposes of the two major locational foci of modem
life-place of residence and place of employment-many members of
minority groups will find themselves in areas associated with criminal
activity
153. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text and infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
154. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
155. George C. Galster, Polarization, Place, and Race, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1430-31 (1993).
156. Id. Professor Galster demonstrates this segregation of urban areas by using a "dissimilarity
index," that "shows how evenly various racial and ethnic groups are spread across neighborhoods within
metropolitan areas." Id. A score of zero indicates completely even integration; a score of one hundred
shows complete segregation. The data Galster uses shows urban areas where African Americans and
Hispanic Americans live to be highly segregated, with members of those groups virtually the only
residents. Id. at tbl. 9.
157. Id. at 1431.
158. Id. at 1431-32.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1431.
161. Id. at 1432 ("[M]inonties' employment opportunities will be restricted in light of progressive
decentralization of jobs (especially those paying decent wages with only modest skill requirements) in
metropolitan areas. The ability of minorities both to learn about and to commute to jobs declines as
proximity to them declines.").
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C. Avoiding the Police
Opinions in post-Terry cases that include avoidance of the police create a
distorted picture. These cases convey the impression that only one reason
exists to avoid police: escaping apprehension for a crime. After all, the cases
all end in a seizure of some evidence, which seizure the defendant then
contests as unconstitutional. These opinions, however, represent only one part
of the universe of cases in which people are stopped because they avoided the
police. It is simply not true that only the guilty avoid the police; there are
many innocent reasons a person might run from them.'62
To be sure, the question for resolution in a hearing to suppress evidence
gained during a Terry stop is not whether the activity observed is innocent,
but whether, in conjunction with other actions, it gives rise to a suspicion that
crime is afoot. The point is that while people may avoid the police for a
variety of reasons, reported cases focus only on those with guilty motiva-
tions. 6 Others who are without guilt are nevertheless stopped and frisked.
They are not charged because the search yields no evidence and no reported
case ever results. Even stops and frisks that do not result in charges carry a
cost, however, albeit one that remains largely invisible: Large numbers of
people are searched and seized, and treated like criminals, when they do not
deserve to be.
With this cost in mind, the question becomes whether some people might
be less inclined to stop and cooperate with police than others. Put another
way, do any particular people have reasons other than guilt to fear encounters
with police and therefore have strong motives to avoid contacts with them?
The answer is yes. More importantly, these are the same people sentenced by
segregation to live in inner city, "high crime" areas.
Put in the simplest terms, the criminal justice system treats African
Americans and Hispanic Americans differently than it does whites. This
disparate treatment reaches beyond the end product of the system, that is, the
fact that African Americans are vastly overrepresented in prisons and jails
relative to their numbers in the general population.' 6 Rather, these inequi-
ties reach down to the first level of the criminal justice process, the points at
which police decide who they will investigate, approach, stop, frisk, and
ultimately arrest. Police are much more likely to stop African-American men
162. See, e.g., EDWARD L DEvITr ET AL., I FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTiONS § 14.08
(1987) ("In your evaluation of this evidence of [flight] you may consider that there may be
reasons-fully consistent with innocence-that could cause a person to [flee]. Fear of law
enforcement or a reluctance to become involved in an investigation may cause a person who has
committed no crime to immediately [flee] ") (emphasis added).
163. Reported cases focus only on guilty persons because only those persons who are found through
stops and frisks to possess contraband or to be committing a crime in some other manner are charged.
Only persons who are charged and convicted appeal their cases, resulting in reported opinions.
164. MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK MEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM 3 (1990) (one in four young African-American men are
under custodial supervision of some kind; the comparable figure for whites is one in 25).
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than white men.' 61 Many African-American males can recount an instance
in which police stopped and questioned them or someone they knew for no
reason, even physically abusing or degrading them in the process. 66 While
the causes of this phenomenon are no doubt complex-among other factors,
racism and simple ignorance surely play a role' 67 -the effect is undeniable:
African Americans, as more frequent targets of undesirable treatment by
police than whites, are naturally more likely to want to avoid contact with the
police. 16' They wish to avoid harassment, baseless stops and frisks, and even
more extreme actions, such as beatings, at the hands of police.' 69
These facts bring us full circle. In many courts an individual's presence in
a high crime location plus evasion of the police equals suspicion reasonable
enough to allow a stop under Terry African Americans, Hispanic Americans,
and poor people are likely to find themselves in such high crime areas, simply
because they live and work there. If these people choose to avoid the
police-a choice they have the constitutional right to make179-the police
may stop them. If the location is not just a high crime area but a location
165. See, e.g., KENNETH C. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 18 (1975) (police discretion results in
disproportionate willingness to stop and search member of the "'kinky (criminal) class,"' who officers
can recognize by "physical characteristics and appearance") (footnote omitted). See generally Johnson,
supra note 136; Herman Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58
J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sc. 433, 446-47 (1967).
166. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters "-Some Preliminary Thoughts About
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 251-53 (describing
numerous instances of less than legal street encounters between police and black males, concluding that
"[b]lack men know they are liable to be stopped at anytime, and that when they question the authority
of the police, the response from the cops is often swift and violent. This applies to black men of all
economic strata, regardless of their level of education, and whatever their job status or place in the
community."); Charles N. Jamison, Jr., Racism: The Hurt That Men Won't Name, EssENcE, Nov. 1992,
at 63; see also Les Payne, Up Against the Wall: Black Men and the Cops, ESSENCE, Nov. 1992, at 134.
Anecdotal evidence of these practices is quite common. See, e.g., Morgan v. Woessner, 975 F.2d 629,
633 (9th Cir. 1992) (former baseball player Joe Morgan was accosted at airport and seized as drug
trafficker because he was black and allegedly changed directions when he saw undercover officers);
Amy Wallace & Stephanie Chavez, Understanding the Riots-Six Months Later, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16,
1992, at JJI (a black psychologist leaves work with his identification badge on during his drive home
in anticipation of being stopped by the police); Michael Winenp, Building Stronger Cases in Gun Trials,
N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1993, at A21 (black attorney, described as a "middle aged, black professional" says
that "he has been stopped in his Volvo in Brooklyn and hassled by the police for no reason").
167. Gaynes, supra note 19, at 624 (suggesting both racism and whites' inability to distinguish
between law-abiding and law-breaking African Americans lies at the bottom of the problem).
168. See, e.g., id. at 625 (recounting both overall patterns and anecdotal evidence of police
harassment of black men). Some courts have recognized these realities. For example, in Ohio v. Crosby,
594 N.E.2d I1I0 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991), two officers in an inner city "drug area" observed a man leaning
into the passenger window of a car in which the defendant driver and his passenger sat. When the
officers approached, the man leaning into the car ran. Both the defendant and his passenger were ordered
out of the car (and in the passenger's case, frisked). Id. at 111-12. The court declared that the fact that
having a conversation with a person leaning into a vehicle in an area known for drug activity, behavior
that the officer called "'indicative of drug trafficking,"' was insufficient to justify a stop and frisk. Id.
at 111. "'It is not unreasonable for a young, black male living in a neighborhood with drug sales and
liable to be stopped to run when approached by a police car whose officers assume a drug sale whenever
someone speaks to someone in a car and believe the mere act of congregating justified a seizure."' Id.
at 112-13 (quoting State v. Amngton, 512 N.E.2d 649, 651-52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)).
169. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 6, at 567-69 (recounting the beating of the author's father by
police officers, witnessed by the author).
170. See supra note 138.
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known for drug activity, the police may go further: They may search the
individual, performing a Terry pat-down. In other words, every person who
works or lives in a high crime area and who avoids the police is subject to
automatic seizure, and to automatic search if the crime suspected involves
drugs. Due to the disproportionately high number of African Americans and
Hispanic Americans living in those areas, they are subject to this treatment
much more often than are whites. 7 '
African Americans and Hispanic Americans therefore become caught in a
vicious cycle. Police use Terry stops aggressively in high crime neighbor-
hoods; as a result, African Americans and Hispanic Americans are subjected
to a high number of stops and frisks.'72 Feeling understandably harassed,
they wish to avoid the police and act accordingly This evasive behavior in
(their own) high crime neighborhoods gives the police that much more power
to stop and frisk.
If this phenomenon only affected the guilty, those possessing contraband,
perhaps it would be easier to live with. It is certain, however, that for all the
stops and frisks that produce evidence there are many that do not. Courts see
only the most skewed sample of all Terry stops police perform: those that
produce incriminating evidence. While statistics concerning the total number
of stops are unavailable (since only stops that result in charges make it into
police and court records), the anecdotal evidence overwhelmingly suggests
that police frequently stop and frisk African Americans and Hispanic
Americans based on very little evidence. 73
These fruitless searches and seizures represent a cost, both to individuals
and to society Not the least of this cost is the effect these stops have in
widening the racial divide in the United States. "Location plus evasion" stops
and frisks, in which police forces consistently treat all-black neighborhoods
like enemy territory, have become the source of a distinctly racial abrasive-
ness for African Americans. Those communities most in need of police
protection may come to regard the police as a racist, occupying force. This
results in an American form of apartheid, in which racially segregated areas
are patrolled by police agents of the white power structure imbued with
special powers because of the "dangerous" nature of the areas they control.
Perhaps it is no wonder Ice-T reaches so many people when he talks about
being stopped for nothing.
171. One could, of course, make a much more direct attack on the use of race as a criterion for
stopping suspects under Terry. See Johnson, supra note 136, at 225-50 (criticizing the broad use of race
in Terry cases on both probabilistic and constitutional grounds); Williams, supra note 6, at 567
(indicating that Terry's condemnation of racial harassment by police has been eroded by subsequent
cases). Such efforts deserve applause. My purpose here, while obviously related, is different: to show
how the facts of location in a crime-prone area and evasion of the police are effectively used as proxies
for race in Terry detentions and searches.
172. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
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IV PROPOSALS
Resolving the problems associated with Terry v. Ohio presents many
challenges. Three possibilities are examined here. The first is a return to the
pre-Terry standard used for all searches and seizures. The second is a
recalibration of the Terry balancing test. Both of these proposals aspire to
address the full universe of Terry problems. The third proposal is aimed only
at the problems highlighted in this Article. Perhaps because it attempts to
solve only one set of difficulties raised by Terry, the third proposal's chance
of success may be the best of the three.
A. Return to the Probable Cause Standard
Overturning Terry represents the cleanest solution to the numerous problems
the case has raised from the beginning. A return to pre-Terry law for all
searches and seizures would address these difficulties comprehensively 174
Courts would have no need to describe the perhaps inarticulable line between
a "mere" hunch and a reasonable suspicion.' 5 The problem of deciding how
much evidence of innocent conduct clustered together is enough to amount to
reasonable suspicion would be easier to address at the level of probable cause.
The inconsistency between cases such as Reid v Georgia and United States
v Sokolow (defensible, if at all, only on the basis of the number of activities
and some deceit by the defendant in the latter case) could be avoided. There
would be no need for emphasis on deference to police within a category of
judgments ruled by a special (that is, reasonable suspicion) standard; instead,
courts could make the same probable cause determination that they customari-
ly do when they issue warrants. If stops and frisks based only on location and
avoidance of police seem questionable under the reasonable suspicion
standard, they would be even more so under the probable cause standard and
therefore less likely to be found constitutional. Perhaps most importantly, a
return to the probable cause standard addresses the most troublesome aspect
of Terry- its balancing of the interests of the state against the "limited"
174. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468,
1471-72 (1985) (recommending that the Court cease inventing exceptions to the warrant and probable
cause requirement and employ them energetically, or adopt a comprehensive reasonableness test);
Maclin, supra note 51, at 1332-33 (recommending abandonment of reasonable suspicion standard and
return to probable cause, even if the latter is now "diluted"). See generally Amsterdam, supra note 101,
at 393-94 (a return to pre-Terry law would focus fourth amendment inquiry on the warrant clause, with
probable cause needed except under exigent circumstances).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) ("Terms like 'articulable reasons'
and 'founded suspicion' are not self-defining "); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62 (1968)
(talking with six or eight drug addicts over a long period will not support reasonable inference that
defendant is engaged in narcotics trafficking); see also Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the
Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 40, 73-75 (quantum of evidence
necessary for arrest is "more probable than not that the person has committed an offense," but for a
Terry stop it is "sufficient that there is a substantial possibility that a crime has been or is about to be
committed" by the defendant).
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intrusion of stops and frisks. 76 Once this balancing is in place, the erosion
of the quantum of evidence necessary to allow intrusions on individuals
becomes almost a foregone conclusion. Returning to pre-Terry law would
eliminate this entire set of difficulties.
Solving a problem, however, requires a practical approach. Only one of the
sitting Supreme Court Justices might favor a return to pre-Terry law 177
Notwithstanding the belief of some commentators that the original intent of
the Constitution's framers and its text are the only legitimate source of
constitutional law, 17 the Court seems quite content with Terry as decid-
ed179 even though Terry arguably represents a clear departure from the
Constitution's text.18 0 Terry's status as a fixed part of constitutional criminal
procedure seems secure.
Perhaps this illustrates that what underlies the Court's Terry jurisprudence
is not constitutional philosophy, but a political approach to criminal justice.
The Court seems as focused as ever on crime control as the central tenet of
criminal procedure,' 8' notwithstanding its refusal to overrule or even contain
176. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 165, at 448-49 ("Are all of the subtle considerations to be
balanced on the spot, in a matter of seconds or minutes, subject to second guessing by the courts? If
the policeman's 'balancing' turns out to produce evidence of crime, how many courts will be ready to
find that he balanced wrongly, that there was not enough suspicion for the crime suspected?"); Scott E.
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN.
L. REV. 383 (1988) (noting difficulty in deciding what qualifies specific police tactics for evaluation
under the Terry balancing test). A return to the probable cause standard that predated Terry would not,
however, be without problems. It could be that the probable cause test would simply be diluted, so that
arrests would be permitted on what is now called reasonable suspicion. These arrests would simply
carry the probable cause label. It might also be that "location plus evasion" stops might not cease under
the pre-Teny standard, but simply continue, albeit less visibly. Neverthless, the return to the pre-Terry
law would oblige courts to work with just one standard, and would obviate the need for the balancing
test.
177. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2140 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasizing that
while "the 'stop' portion of the Terry 'stop-and-frisk' holding" accords with pre-Terry law, there is no
support for the frisking of persons stopped unless they are first arrested).
178. See, e.g., id. at 2139 (Scalia, J., concumng) ("I take it to be a findamental principle of
constitutional adjudication that the terms in the Constitution must be given the meaning ascribed to them
at the time of their ratification."); JOHN H. GARVEY & T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, MODERN
CONsTrrUiONAL THEORY 27 (2d ed. 1991) ("A familiar claim in constitutional law is that the original
intent of the framers ought to control constitutional interpretation.'). Compare Richard S. Kay,
Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses,
82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226, 228 (1988) (stating that opponents of original intent "[reject] the conventional
norm ofjudicial review-adherence to the original intentions of the Constitution's enactors"), with Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204,234 (1980) (critiquing
both textualism and onginalism, stating that "explicit reliance on onginalist sources has played a very
small role compared to the elaboration of the Court's own precedents').
179. See, e.g., Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2135-36. In the face of Minnesota's efforts to persuade the
Supreme Court to turn Terry into an evidence-gathering tool, see supra note 115, the Court reaffirmed
that Terry is an "exception" to the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement and that if a frisk
goes beyond its protective function, its fruits will be suppressed.
180. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 36-38 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[P]olice officers up to today
have been permitted to effect arrests or search without warrants only when the facts within their personal
knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable cause. The infringement on
personal liberty of any 'seizure' of a person can only be 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment if
we require the police to possess 'probable cause' before they seize him.') (emphasis added).
181. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LiMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-246 (1968) (contrasting
crime control and due process models of the criminal justice system); Macin, supra note 51, at 1334
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certain cases... that symbolize the "discredited" jurisprudence of the Warren
Court. 3 Terry may have originated with the Warren Court, but it is
fundamentally a decision that gives the police added leverage in confronting
street crime. Its origins in the context of civil unrest in 1968 and the "law and
order" political rhetoric that accompanied this violence speak volumes about
the underlying purpose of the case. That purpose-simple crime con-
trol-seems, if anything, more attractive today than it did in 1968.1a 4 Thus
while a return to the probable cause standard seems desirable from the points
of view of both doctrine and legal problem solving, it is, at least in the
current environment, an impractical idea.i" 5
B. Recalibrating Terry
Several commentators advocate reforming Terry by readjusting the balance
it strikes between police and individual interests. 8 6 Requiring a greater
amount of evidence in Terry cases in order to find the existence of reasonable
suspicion could solve the problem highlighted here-location plus evasion
equals reasonable suspicion-and in general would tip the balance away from
law enforcement and toward greater protection of civil liberties.
Recalibrating Terry creates two problems. First, some of these proposals are
so complex, and the recalibration of Terry they propose so subtle, that in the
end they may make little difference." 7 Especially in light of the cases that
(stating that the Court "remains fixated on expanding the government's investigatory powers to help
control the drug crisis" despite evidence of its futility).
182. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 147 (1990) (extending the rule of Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which itself is an extension of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
183. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION 119 (1986) (calling Warren Court decisions in the area of
criminal procedure "a discredited criminal jurisprudence").
184. David A. Harris, Review Essay, The Realities of Punishment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1301, 1314-15 (1993) (despite the fact that a dozen years of incarceration-based criminal justice has had
negligible effect on crime, political leaders continue to use fear of crime on voters, who continue to
respond); Phil Gramm, Don't Let Judges Set Crooks Free, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1993, at AlI (arguing
that "domestic crime is now the greatest threat to the safety and well being of Americans").
185. In general, the Court simply seems unwilling to upset the balance struck in the criminal
procedure cases of the 1960's and 1970's. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424-28 (1986)
(while the Court refused to extend Miranda, it would not overturn it).
186. See Sundby, supra note 176, at 386 (stating that the proposed "composite model" of the Fourth
Amendment "appropriately reorients fourth amendment analysis toward protecting privacy interests");
see also LaFave, supra note 175, at 124 (1968) (recommending, inter alia, that legislative bodies
participate in regulating police conduct in field interrogations); Esther J. Windmueller, Note, Reasonable
Articulable Suspicion: The Demise of Terry v. Ohio and Individualized Suspicion, 25 U. RiCH. L. REv.
543, 563-64 (1991) (advocating "a return to strict Terry interpretation"). Professor Johnson makes a
related point: Factors evaluated in the Terry balancing test should be evaluated both probablistically, to
ensure that they actually predict criminal behavior and not simple prejudice, and constitutionally, under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Johnson, supra note 136, at 215-25.
187. For example, Professor Sundby's composite model is an imaginative and well-crafted attempt
to reconcile the reasonableness and warrant clauses of the Fourth Amendment. In its handling of Terry
stops, however, the model is quite complex and may make little difference in the outcome. Terry stops
would be analyzed under the warrant clause, shifting the focus of these encounters back to the warrant
and probable cause requirements. However, exigent circumstances (in the form of the danger to the
officer's safety) would supply an exception; therefore, probable cause would not be required. Professor
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obligate courts reviewing Terry stops to defer to police and consider facts
from the police point of view, these proposals simply may not make enough
of a difference to change anything. Second, these proposals leave the
balancing process in place. To the extent that the balancing of interests
represents the root cause of the types of difficulties highlighted in this
Article,' 8 the problems may recur.
C. Innocent and Necessaiy and Constitutionally Protected Activities
A third proposal is to make the combination of innocent and necessary
activity and constitutionally protected activity legally insufficient to rise to the
level of reasonable suspicion.
This proposal is less ambitious than either of the first two. To be sure, it
will not resolve all of the larger structural problems that underlie and
accompany Terry; only a return to pre-Terry law can do that. Nevertheless,
this recommendation would address the subset of Terry problems discussed
here.
The "location plus evasion" cases involve two categories of activities. The
first category is innocent and necessary activity; the second is activity
protected by the Constitution. Innocent but necessary activity consists of
noncriminal actions that people cannot avoid. The prototypical example would
be the act of being in a place where one lives or works. If one resides or
works in a particular location, his presence in that location is more than
innocent if no criminal activity is taking place; it is necessary for that
person's day-to-day functioning as a human being. Those engaged in innocent
and necessary activity can avoid police intrusions based on such factors only
by forgoing these activities.
Surely, not all activity that takes place in these locations is innocent.
Further, if these locations are frequently host to illegal activities, presence in
them might make an observer suspicious in a way that presence in more
Sundby admits that this:
poses a new problem. To avoid coming fill circle back to initiatory intrusions and the
reasonableness clause, the solution should preserve individualized suspicion but modify the level
of suspicion to accommodate the exigency. If Terry was decided under the composite model,
therefore, the ultimate standard for a stop and frisk would be the same, reasonable suspicion,
except the reasoning would depend upon a warrant clause-exigent circumstances analysis rather
than a reasonableness clause-balancing test analysis.
Sundby, supra note 176, at 421-22.
188. See, e.g., id. at 439 ('[The difference in the nature of the individual and government interests"
causes the balancing test to naturally favor the government, since government's interests--"savng lives,
catching illegal aliens, stopping the flow of illegal narcotics"--overshadow the individual's "much less
tangible" pnvacy interests.); Schwartz, supra note 165, at 448 (pointing out that having police officers
balance "subtle considerations" in the field seems too much to ask); Windmueller, supra note 186, at
559 (balancing test favors governmeht); see also Maclin, supra note 51, at 1264 (stating that the
Supreme Court's claim that it uses a balancing test is "deceptive", it actually uses "three tacit rules that
provide the doctrinal foundation for its decisions involving police encounters"). But see LaFave, supra
note 175, at 57 ("The balancing test makes more sense if it is viewed not so much as a matter of case-
by-case application, but rather as a technique for establishing the quantum of evidence needed for certain
distinct kinds of official action.").
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neutral locations would not. The point is that basing reasonable suspicion
upon presence in these areas puts an unfair burden on those who must, of
necessity, be there. 8 9 This idea no doubt forms part of what is behind cases
such as Brown v Texas. 90 Presence in a place where crimes occur, even in
proximity to persons who commit those crimes, is insufficient to permit a
Terry stop, let alone an arrest.' 9'
The second category of activities encompasses those in which people have
an explicit constitutional right to engage. For purposes of this discussion, the
most important such activity is the exercise of the right to be left alone by the
police. Even if the police have a right to walk up to and address any person,
the person addressed has an equal right to walk away 192 The fact that the
subject walks away does not bring the encounter to the level of reasonable
suspicion needed for a Terry stop.'93 If this were not so, the right to walk
away would be meaningless; exercising the right would extinguish the
freedom the right protects.
If neither the innocent but necessary activity of being in a high crime area,
nor avoidance of the police could supply a sufficient basis for a Terry stop,
both factors together should not support one either. Those who find it
necessary to be in high crime areas are often the same people who find it
prudent to exercise their constitutional right to avoid the police. To allow a
seizure based on the combination of the two factors, each insufficient by
itself, robs both factors of any significance. Thus, the conjunction of location
and evasion should never be enough, alone, to give rise to reasonable
suspicion. 94
The argument as to drug-connected frisks is similar. Location in an area of
drug activity carries a double penalty- it allows both a stop (through a
suspicion that crime is afoot) and a frisk (through the fiction that any drug-
related activity is always armed activity). If Terry frisks truly require
189. Cf Maclin, supra note 51, at 1324 ("The fundamental point is that police officials should not
be free to effect seizures based upon factors allegedly possessed by those engaged in cnminal conduct,
but also shared by a significant percentage of innocent persons ").
190. Brown, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
191. Id.
192. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. Certainly, people have a right to engage in the
innocent but noncnminal activity described earlier. This right is so obvious that finding explicit
protection for it in the Constitution might be difficult. For that reason, I separate these two categories.
193. Florida v. Bostick, 11I S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991) ("[A) refusal to cooperate, without more, does
not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure."); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) ("[A person] may not be detained even momentarily without
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more,
furnish those grounds.").
194. Professor Johnson set out a similar scheme of categories: conduct resembling a crime, conduct
that appears to reflect consciousness of guilt, characteristics of the actor, and the environment in which
the actor is observed. She then evaluated them both probabilistically and constitutionally. Johnson, supra
note 136, at 215-25. My point is both narrower and somewhat different, though related. Location carries
grave danger of probabilistic error to those who live in crime-prone areas due to societal constraints;
evasion is both constitutionally protected and, for many people, understandable. Therefore, I argue that
rather than making a probabilistic and constitutional evaluation, these factors ought not to be available
to courts at all, even in combination, as a basis for reasonable suspicion, unless other factors clearly
indicative of criminality are present.
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reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous, allowing the
frisk just because the original suspicion and stop is based on presence in a
drug-plagued area represents nothing more than bootstrapping. If combining
location and evasion should not allow a Terry stop, the drug-related nature of
the location should not be enough to support a frisk.
In order for a stop and frisk to take place, the law should require that
something more than a location of high crime or drug activity and evasion of
the police be present, something clearly indicative of criminality For
example, gestures known to be characteristic of drug activity, such as using
particular hand signals to indicate the availability of contraband, in addition
to location and evasion, could be enough. For a frisk, the law should require
not just possible drug possession or trafficking, but an indication that the
suspect is armed.
Such a rule would not necessarily require a rethinking of Sokolow 195
While all of the defendant's actions in Sokolow are consistent with innocence,
no activity in Sokolow is both innocent and necessary, in the sense that being
at one's home or place of work is necessary Additionally, to the extent that
both the "location plus evasion" cases and Sokolow are about clusters of
innocent activity, Sokolow contains more than two such activities. 19 6
The rule proposed here would have at least two salutary effects. First,
existing law that protects, separately, the rights to be in a place and to refuse
to respond to police stops without reasonable suspicion would be respected
and kept vital. Allowing a Terry stop based on the combination of location
and evasion empties both rights of meaning and content. It causes the rights
to, in effect, cancel each other out, instead of existing as related, complemen-
tary rights protecting personal freedom and autonomy Second, it would
remove from the courts a set of cases, and from the police arsenal a group of
techniques, that clearly have a disproportionate impact on the poor, and on
racial and ethnic minorities.
195. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (involving use of drug couner profile at airport).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard the Sokolow case below, reversing the
conviction. United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987). It used a theory similar to the one
proposed here. The Court of Appeals divided facts into two categories, the first of which included
"ongoing criminal activity," such as the use of aliases. Id. at 1419. The second category consisted of
"personal characteristics," such as using cash to pay for tickets, or appearing nervous. Id. at 1420.
According to the Ninth Circuit, "personal characteristics" were relevant only if there was also evidence
of "ongoing criminal behavior", the court found none of the latter. Id. The Supreme Court in Sokolow
rejected this test, finding it "not in keeping with our decisions." 490 U.S. at 8. In fact, the Supreme
Court really seems tc be most troubled by the Ninth Circuit's division of evidence into the two
categones, with the former being strong and the latter merely "probabilistic." Id. The Supreme Court's
treatment of the evidence is not actually so different from what the Ninth Circuit did, though the two
courts came out differently. This similarity of the analyses between the two opinions supports the
conclusion that the court of appeals' method is generally correct, though in Sokolow it may have been
wrongly applied.
196. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 1.
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CONCLUSION
Twenty-five years after Terry v Ohio, Minnesota v Dickerson presents an
opportunity to see the effect of allowing searches and seizures based on less
than probable cause. The balancing of law enforcement and individual
interests has become so routine that it barely stirs interest anymore.
Nevertheless, what the cases make obvious is alarming: a steady decline in the
amount of evidence needed to find reasonable suspicion. The cases after
Terry, Sibron, and Brown progressed from statements mandating deference to
law enforcement, to support for searches and seizures based on groups of
innocent activities, to seizures based on no suspicion at all if the needs of law
enforcement seem serious enough.
The result is hardly surprising. As the war against crime, and especially
drugs, became a more important public policy objective, presence in areas
where these activities take place, in conjunction with failure to cooperate with
police, emerged as sufficient legal justification for Terry stops and frisks. The
fact that these bare circumstances appear in so many cases attests to the fact
that police view such stops and frisks as both productive and potent as law
enforcement tools.
This represents a cost to society People are seized and searched who might
not have been under -the probable cause standard. The cost falls unevenly
across society Most Americans of the majority race do not pay this cost; poor
people and members of racial and ethnic minority groups do. Division of the
cost of crime fighting along racial lines would never be defended openly; yet
there it is. The unfairness of the situation is obvious. The disrespect it
engenders for law enforcement in people who have to cope with this treatment
day in and day out is incalculable.
Replacing the current regime with a rule that requires more for reasonable
suspicion than a high crime location plus avoidance of police is the minimum
that must be done to restore some balance to inner-city law enforcement. The
criminal justice system-including the police-must not only be and appear
just in the courtroom; it must also be and appear just on the street. Racially
disparate use of stops and frisks offend every principle of fairness and
evenhandedness that our society purports to hold.
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